We are happy to announce that CASCO Signal Ltd. (CASCO) and Prover Technology (Prover) have entered into a long-term agreement for the supply of Prover’s Signal Design Automation product suite Prover Trident. The initial focus is to further strengthen CASCO’s position as a leading supplier of signaling systems for China’s railway segment, by the use [...]
2017 an idea was born at Prover Technology, we wanted to create a forum for sharing experiences and best practices, and for networking. Our intention was to gather leading signaling management peers from all over the world to discuss the latest evolutions of design automation and formal verification– software technologies to automate design and verification [...]
The Tool providers that support HLL have now agreed on the content of the next published version of HLL. It will be a merge of the different dialects of HLL that exist today. One language for all Over the years tool providers have developed HLL in different directions in order to solve their particular needs and to [...]
The HLL Forum meeting we had in December decided to let a subgroup work on a new language definition meeting emerging needs in the market. Some of us in this subgroup compete as software tool providers, however we share the vision of a standard language definition, and we strongly believe that the users of HLL [...]
If you have read the first two parts of this series (Read Part 1 here and Part 2 here), then you know that verifying an interlocking that satisfies safety requirements is not an easy task to accomplish. Due to the huge size of the state space of the interlocking, neither manual methods nor testing will [...]
Hopefully you have read part 1 on this blog, where I tried to convince you that traditional methods will not get you very far when verifying safety requirements for railway interlockings. This time my task is to convince you that formal verification will get you far. In fact, all the way. So what is formal [...]
The subject I am going to write about this time is not an easy one. I will try to explain why formal verification is good. In particular, why it is a good practice to use formal verification when verifying safety requirements on railway systems. The Verification Problem In order to make a convincing argument, I [...]
